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TORT IMMUNITY IN THE PANDEMIC
BETSY J. GREY * AND SAMANTHA ORWOLL **
INTRODUCTION
The Covid-19 pandemic set off a public health emergency that quickly brought
doctors and other health care providers to the front line, while shuttering businesses
throughout the United States. In response to the emergency, the federal and state
governments rapidly created broad protections from tort liability for health care
providers. To encourage businesses to reopen, some states have also provided
liability protection for businesses from personal injury suits brought by patrons and
employees. Congress is considering similar protections for businesses as it
contemplates further aid packages. Some industries, like nursing homes and
universities, are lobbying for specific immunity. This Essay overviews some of these
liability shields, examines their relative necessity and value, and anticipates some of
the issues that will inevitably arise as the provisions are implemented.
Part I briefly explains that, even without liability shields, potential plaintiffs face
high hurdles under traditional common law principles to successfully bring personal
injury lawsuits for Covid-19 related injuries. Proof of the elements of negligence and
overcoming traditional defenses will be difficult, whether suit is brought against
businesses, health care workers, or employers. These common law obstacles call into
question the need for further liability protections.
That said, the strongest case for liability shields is for health care workers–those
who are on the frontlines of the battle against the pandemic. Part II reviews the
shields that have been promulgated for these workers both at the state and federal
levels. While Part II concludes that these shields serve health care policy, it questions
whether similar protections should extend to treatment of non-Covid-19 patients, as
is being advocated by the American Medical Association.
Parts III and IV consider whether the need for immunity for businesses is
comparable to health care workers. These Parts conclude that providing immunity to
businesses is counterproductive and detracts from important values served by tort
liability: Part III from the perspective of suits against employers and Part IV from
the point of view of patron suits against businesses open to the public. Preliminarily,
it is debatable whether immunity shields are even necessary. Lawmakers assume
these shields are critical to encouraging businesses to resume normal business
activities, an assumption that is not supported by the data. 1 It is likely that other
challenges facing businesses in the pandemic, such as reduced business operations
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1
Small Business Coronavirus Impact Poll, U.S. CHAMBER OF COM. (June 3, 2020,
8:00 AM), https://www.uschamber.com/report/small-business-coronavirus-impactpoll-june [https://perma.cc/3JFK-LKR5] (finding that seventy-nine percent of small
businesses were either fully or partially open by the end of May 2020).
*
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to allow for social distancing or lower patronage due to public fear of exposure, may
be inhibiting resumption of full business activities far more than the potential for
liability. Significantly, very few personal injury lawsuits have been filed against
businesses since the pandemic began in the United States. 2
At the same time, providing immunity shields to businesses comes at a high cost.
Although immunity allows defendants to escape lawsuits at or near the pleading
stage, this type of “bail-out” removes fundamental incentives for businesses to
operate safely. Even though our country is currently fraught with inconsistent
messaging regarding safety and businesses, we need to encourage businesses to make
reasonable efforts to keep up to date on the information regarding the virus, take
reasonable precautions, and provide reasonable notice of risks to those potentially
exposed. Immunity from civil liability lowers the incentive to take these precautions
and to create a safe workplace or business. In the absence of, or in addition to,
“government-provided” immunity, some businesses have created their own private
liability shields through liability waivers, as discussed in Part IV. Whether these
shields are enforceable is questionable, but in any event, they should be discouraged
in the Covid-19 context. A business that meets the appropriate standard of care to
provide a safe environment would not need waivers; reliance on waivers may
disincentivize businesses from taking needed safety steps during the pandemic.
Liability shields shift loss away from accountable parties, and thus deprive
deserving victims of the ability to receive compensation for preventable injuries.
Some industries, like nursing homes, already were experiencing considerable
problems due to faulty practices even before the pandemic, and liability shields may
overprotect those industries. Part V concludes that the benefits from the tort system
outweigh the questionable need to provide liability shields for businesses. 3 Finally,
other systems, such as insurance and government compensation funds, can be used
to encourage businesses to reopen and stay open.

See Covid-19 Case Tracking Research, PERKINS COIE LLP (July 2020),
https://www.perkinscoie.com/images/content/2/3/v8/234690/Perkins-Coie-ClientAdvantage-COVID-Case-Tracking-Research-Exter.pdf [https://perma.cc/79BDVPYX]. The largest number of suits filed this far have been against insurance
companies for disputes over business interruption coverage. Id.; see also COVID19 Complaint Tracker, HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH,
https://www.huntonak.com/en/covid-19-tracker.html [https://perma.cc/3REQA8SZ] (reporting very few tort claims).
3
Some have argued that these liability shields are really just a decoy to enact tort
reform at a federal level. See Michael L. Rustad, Your Right to Sue, Goodnight!,
NULR OF NOTE (June 15, 2020), https://blog.northwesternlaw.review/?p=1487
[https://perma.cc/8JGR-CSZS].
2
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I. HURDLES TO PERSONAL INJURY LAWSUITS
In a tort suit, the plaintiff must prove several elements. 4 The plaintiff must first
demonstrate the duty of care the actor owes to the injured party and that the defendant
failed to exercise that level of care. 5 The duty generally requires the actor to exercise
reasonable care. 6
Defining reasonable care is usually a comparative view as to how other reasonable
actors would act under the circumstances. 7 In the healthcare context, the medical
malpractice standard of care refers to best practices of the reasonable practitioner in
the field facing similar circumstances. For healthcare professionals treating patients
with Covid-19, that duty would take into account conditions such as treating a novel
illness without established treatment plans, shortages of beds, staff and personal
protective equipment (PPE), and sparse testing. Given these extraordinary
circumstances, with so much unknown about the virus, the standard of care would
not be on par with treating known diseases, and plaintiffs likely will have difficulty
proving that the provider failed to exercise the appropriate level of care.
Defining the duty of care that businesses owe to their employees and patrons in
the context of Covid-19 is equally, if not more, challenging. Employers owe a duty
to provide a safe environment; exercising that duty takes into account the use of
known, cost-effective precautions (like use of gloves, masks, temperature checks,
and social distancing), complying with relevant governmental regulations and
guidelines, following the standards and customs of safe practices for that type of
business, as well as exercising common sense. It would also take into account the
high level of risk involved and the state of knowledge on the spread and prevention
of Covid-19. Our knowledge of how the virus spreads keeps shifting, along with the
appropriate measures to prevent the spread. These factors will complicate plaintiffs’
ability to prove that business owners failed in their duty of safety to their customers
and employees. For employers, the availability of workers’ compensation may
provide an additional liability shield, while other strong defenses, like compliance
with regulation, comparative fault, and assumption of risk, may come into play.
Plaintiffs also must prove the element of causation, demonstrating that
defendant’s failure to provide reasonable care caused the plaintiff’s injury. 8 For
example, a plaintiff would bear the burden of proving that the exposure to the virus
occurred in the workplace or business setting. Given the highly contagious nature of
the disease, this may prove an insurmountable hurdle. Determining causation from
Covid-19 exposure is complicated by the lack of evidence, due to sometimes sparse
testing, asymptomatic vectors, undetectable periods, the number of potential
exposures and different types of airborne transmissions. With the enormous
difficulty of proving causation in this context, it may prove fatal to a plaintiff’s

DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, HORNBOOK ON TORTS §
9.5 (2d. ed. 2016).
5
Id.
6
Id. at § 9.1.
7
Id. at § 10.5.
8
Id. at § 9.5.
4
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lawsuit. Proving causation may be less difficult in settings that are more contained,
like cruise ships, nursing homes, prisons, and dormitories. Contact tracing may offer
some evidence that an individual contracted the virus in a business setting. Our
understanding of the ways of virus transmission continues to develop, which also
affects causal proof. Generally, however, proving causation in a business setting may
be a plaintiff’s highest hurdle to a successful suit.
Notwithstanding these high hurdles to bringing a successful tort suit for personal
injury, state and federal governments have created shields for healthcare providers
and businesses from tort liability. These immunity provisions are discussed below.
II. LIABILITY PROTECTION FOR HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS
After the Covid-19 outbreak, the state and federal governments quickly created a
number of strong protections from civil liability for healthcare workers. These
liability shields generally address negligence-based behavior and not willful
misconduct. Two main federal laws, the Public Readiness and Emergency
Preparedness (PREP) Act and the Coronavirus, Aid, Relief, and Economic Security
(CARES) Act, address liability protections. The federal government enacted the
PREP Act in 2005 to provide liability protections during public health emergencies. 9
With its extension to Covid-19, it covers health professionals who administer or use
countermeasures to treat, cure, prevent, or mitigate Covid-19. 10 Similarly, the federal
government enacted the CARES Act to protect volunteer health care professionals
during the Covid-19 emergency. 11
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) urged the state governors to
provide immunity for healthcare professionals from liability for medical
malpractice. 12 As described below, some states already had immunity shields in place
and others responded to the call by passing legislation or creating executive orders.
A. Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act
The PREP Act has a broad reach. It authorizes the Secretary of HHS to issue a
Declaration providing immunity from liability in response to a public health
emergency. 13 The Declaration may provide immunity to covered persons for federal
and state claims relating to the administration or use of certain countermeasures. On

See infra note 13.
See infra note 14.
11
See infra note 20.
12
Letter from Alex M. Azar II, Secretary of Health and Human Services to
Governors (Mar. 24, 2020),
https://www.ncsbn.org/HHS_Secretary_Letter_to_States_Licensing_Waivers.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W8V5-G69S].
13
42 U.S.C. § 247d–6d.
9

10
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March 10, 2020, Secretary Alex Azar issued a Declaration 14 that defined
“countermeasures” to include antivirals, drugs, biologics, diagnostics, devices, or
vaccines used to combat Covid-19. 15 “Qualified pandemic products” are also
countermeasures. 16 Under the Declaration, covered persons include manufacturers,
distributors, or program planners of a countermeasure as well as those who prescribe,
administer, or dispense a countermeasure. To receive immunity, a covered person
must have a contract with the federal government or act according to an authority
having jurisdiction, which can include local agencies with a legal responsibility to
respond to the pandemic. 17
Immunity applies to claims for personal injury or damage to property. 18 The Act
does not protect against willful misconduct or actions brought by the United States
government. However, an individual or entity who is not covered but who complies
with the PREP Act requirements and conditions of the Declaration may receive
immunity if the individual or entity could have reasonably believed the activity was
covered. 19
B. Coronavirus, Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act
The CARES Act provides immunity from liability under federal and state law for
volunteer healthcare professionals. 20 To receive protection, volunteers must: act
within the scope of their state license, registration, or certification, not exceed the
scope of license, registration, or certification of a substantially similar health
professional in the state where the act or omission occurs, and not act in bad faith or

Declaration Under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act for
Medical Countermeasures Against COVID-19, 85 Fed. Reg. 15,198 (Mar. 17,
2020).
15
Id. at 15,202.
16
Id. Qualified pandemic products must be cleared by the FDA, authorized under
an Emergency Use Authorization, described in the CDC’s Emergency Use
Instructions, or used under either an Investigational New Drug Application or an
Investigational Device Exemption. Robert P. Charrow, Advisory Opinion on the
Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act and the March 10, 2020
Declaration Under the Act April 17, 2020, as Modified on May 19, 2020, HHS
(May 19, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/prep-act-advisory-opinionhhs-ogc.pdf [https://perma.cc/F28S-6VKF].
17
See supra note 14.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Coronavirus, Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116–136, §
3215, 134 Stat. 281, 374–75 (2020).
14
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engage in willful misconduct. 21 The CARES Act also amends the PREP Act to
include certain respirators as “covered countermeasures.” 22
C. State Protections
State laws also provide immunity from liability for healthcare workers and
facilities. Before the Covid-19 outbreak, several states had statutes limiting liability
for healthcare providers during public health emergencies. 23 These statutes generally
eliminate liability for acts or omissions causing injury, death, or property damage
unless the healthcare worker’s conduct constitutes gross negligence or willful
misconduct. After the outbreak, other states passed similar legislation protecting
healthcare workers during the pandemic. 24 Similarly, many governors have
responded to the outbreak by issuing executive orders shielding healthcare workers
from liability. 25 The protections generally do not protect against gross negligence or
willful misconduct. 26
D. Coverage Issues that May Arise
As mentioned, even without these protections, the standard of care for hospitals
and healthcare providers would automatically take into account the extraordinary
conditions of the pandemic and minimize the risk of health worker liability. But with
the added shield provided by the state and federal measures, these workers are
ensured even broader protection from suit. Most people would probably agree that
added protection against healthcare worker liability is warranted, even if only for
symbolic purposes, given that these people are on the frontline of the pandemic and
face a heightened risk of contracting the virus. Beyond symbolism, liability shields

21

Id.
Coronavirus, Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116–136, §
3103, 134 Stat. 281, 361 (2020).
23
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit 20, § 3129 (West 2007); IOWA CODE ANN. § 135.147
(West 2007); LA. STAT. ANN. § 29:771(B)(2)(c) (2003); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 801–
225.01–.02 (West 2014).
24
See S.B. 150, 2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2020); S.B. 2640, 191st Gen. Court,
Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2020); S.B. 300, 2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2020).
25
See Ariz. Exec. Order No. 2020–27 (Apr. 9, 2020),
https://azgovernor.gov/executive-orders [https://perma.cc/R2R9-AY6Y]; Conn.
Exec. Order No. 7V (Apr. 7, 2020), https://portal.ct.gov/-/media/Office-of-theGovernor/Executive-Orders/Lamont-Executive-Orders/Executive-Order-No7V.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/D75W-CETW]; Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.14.20.01
(Apr. 14, 2020), https://gov.georgia.gov/executive-action/executive-orders/2020executive-orders [https://perma.cc/VPM3-USJL]; Ill. Exec. Order No. 2020–19
(Apr. 1, 2020), https://www2.illinois.gov/Pages/ExecutiveOrders/ExecutiveOrder2020-19.aspx [https://perma.cc/7F8W-4KHD].
26
See supra note 25.
22
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may encourage healthcare workers to step forward to deal with the surge of cases in
the face of limited equipment.
Even if the shields are an important immediate step, how long should these
liability protections last? Experts have warned that the pandemic may continue for
eighteen to twenty-four months, 27 but it could be even longer–if ever–before there
are no active cases. Many states have provided immunity for the duration of the
public health emergency, so governors and legislatures will decide when to remove
the protections. 28 For those liability protections that are not specifically tied to the
duration of the public health emergency, should the protections continue until there
are no active cases? If Covid-19 infection rates eventually decrease to levels similar
to the seasonal flu, the broad liability protections for healthcare workers may no
longer be necessary.
The ever-changing state of knowledge on the virus presents challenges. It is
critical to ensure that healthcare workers stay abreast of developments that will help
them fight the virus. But while we can count on the professionalism of the vast
majority of these workers to keep up with advances in treatment, liability shields may
create something of a disincentive for others to do so. Without the accountability that
the tort system brings, some workers and facilities may become less safe and fall
below the evolving standard of care. So as strong as the case may be for liability
shields now–especially as we are encouraging health care workers to risk their own
lives to meet the crisis–the benefits of these shields may diminish over time as the
health crisis eases and risks to the health care workers are better managed.
Aside from duration and sliding scale questions, we also face difficult questions
over the type and extent of liability protections in different contexts. These questions
are at the forefront of issues surrounding shields for nursing home providers, the
medical provider’s decision to postpone elective surgery for patients, and licensure
relaxation.
Take immunity protections for nursing homes. Nursing homes have seen
notoriously high rates of Covid-19. 29 Although nursing homes have pushed for
immunity from Covid-19 related lawsuits, federal legislation shielding hospitals and
healthcare workers has not covered nursing homes. Many states have explicitly

See, e.g., Kristine A. Moore, Marc Lipsitch, John M. Barry, & Michael T.
Osterholm, COVID-19: The CIDRAP Viewpoint, CIDRAP, (Apr. 30, 2020),
https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/sites/default/files/public/downloads/cidrap-covid19viewpoint-part1_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/9952-F96X].
28
See Conn Exec. Order No. 7V (Apr. 7, 2020), https://portal.ct.gov//media/Office-of-the-Governor/Executive-Orders/Lamont-ExecutiveOrders/Executive-Order-No-7V.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/8CTT-5EDM]; Ga.
Exec. Order No. 04.14.20.01 (Apr. 14, 2020); S.B. 2640, 191st Gen. Court, Reg.
Sess. (Mass. 2020).
29
One estimate (as of June 28, 2020) placed the number of nursing homes deaths
due to Covid-19 at over 35,000. COVID-19 Nursing Home Data, CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://data.cms.gov/stories/s/COVID-19-NursingHome-Data/bkwz-xpvg [https://perma.cc/L9YQ-2D5L].
27
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provided immunity for nursing homes, 30 but in other states, the question whether
nursing homes are protected has not yet been tested.
Nursing homes demonstrate the conflicts and costs involved in providing
immunity shields. Even with the uncertainty surrounding the virus, the dangers of
the virus to older individuals and high risk of transmission in contained spaces were
quickly discovered. 31 In response, federal officials have curtailed routine inspections
since March and nursing homes have restricted outside visitors. 32
Under tort law, nursing homes would be responsible for a high standard of care,
given the heightened vulnerability of their residents. Certainly, nursing homes face
huge challenges: they may function with extremely limited budgets, be unable to
maintain social distancing when caring for patients with severe pre-existing
conditions, and face PPE shortages and high risks to their own workers. Although
these factors may be considered when determining the duty of care, they would not
excuse the lack of due care.
Critics argue that providing immunity for nursing homes will mask long-term
problems with the industry and make accountability much more difficult. 33
Regulation has not been effective in recent years and precautions taken in light of the
pandemic, like restricting visitors and decreasing inspections, have made monitoring

See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3082 (Consol. 2020); S.B. 704, 2020 Leg., 2019–
2020 Sess. (N.C. 2020). According to a Washington Post article, about twenty
states have provided some form of liability immunity to nursing homes. Debbie
Cenziper, Peter Whoriskey, Shawn Mulcahy, & Joel Jacobs, As Nursing Home
Residents Died, New Covid-19 Protections Shielded Companies from Lawsuits.
Families Say That Hides the Truth, WASH. POST (June 8, 2020, 5:13 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/06/08/nursing-home-immunitylaws/ [https://perma.cc/7KAE-JQ42].
31
See, e.g., Jonel Aleccia, Coronavirus Cluster Near Seattle Highlights
Vulnerability of Nursing Homes, NPR (Mar. 2, 2020, 4:57 PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/03/02/811276257/coronaviruscluster-near-seattle-highlights-vulnerability-of-nursing-homes
[https://perma.cc/V4NQ-YKRL].
32
See Press Release, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., CMS Announces
New Measures to Protect Nursing Home Residents from COVID-19, (Mar. 13,
2020), https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/press-releases/cms-announces-newmeasures-protect-nursing-home-residents-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/H84X-69FF].
33
Abigail Abrams, 'A License for Neglect.' Nursing Homes Are Seeking — and
Winning — Immunity Amid the Coronavirus Pandemic, TIME (May 14, 2020, 2:40
PM), https://time.com/5835228/nursing-homes-legal-immunity-coronavirus/
[https://perma.cc/LN77-HT43] (“[T]he pandemic has exposed longstanding
problems in the industry, such as staffing shortages and infection control violations,
and that taking away its legal liability will make it harder to hold facilities to
account now and in the future.”).
30
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much more difficult. 34 Providing liability shields reduces the incentives to address
problems like infection control and may even create a race to the bottom for the
standard of care. If nursing homes cannot implement sufficient safety measures for
their residents in the pandemic context, liability shields may not be the best approach
to dealing with the problem; increased regulation and monitoring, along with tort
liability, may be a better way to help correct it.
Other satellite litigation from liability shields will arise in the healthcare context
with regard to treatment of non-Covid-19 patients. Many state executive orders
expanded the use of telemedicine and lessened or eliminated restrictions on out-ofstate healthcare workers providing care. 35 These expansions alter the care that
patients receive, but whether this will lead to liability or be shielded by immunity is
unknown. Similarly, many executive orders postponed nonessential surgeries and
procedures. 36 These orders raise the question of whether immunity meant to protect
healthcare professionals caring for Covid-19 patients applies to decisions made about
other patients. The American Medical Association is advocating to extend immunity
protections from harm due to surgeries and procedures that were postponed or
foregone during the pandemic. 37 Critics question whether such broad immunity,
which would include claims made by non-Covid-19 patients, is necessary because

These problems are exacerbated by the lack of transparency to virus information
in nursing homes. For example, in Arizona, the public health authority have refused
to respond to public records requests for information on Covid-19 infections and
mortality rates in nursing homes. See Craig Harris, Judge Rules Ducey
Administration Does Not Have to Release COVID-19 Nursing Home Records,
AZCENTRAL (May 29, 2020, 8:44 PM),
https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/arizona-health/2020/05/29/judge-rulesarizona-nursing-home-covid-19-records-private/5283835002/
[https://perma.cc/VN6T-EM3H].
35
See Ariz. Exec. Order No. 2020-15 (Mar. 25, 2020),
https://azgovernor.gov/sites/default/files/eo_202015_expansion_of_telemedicine_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KGN-VARZ]; Kan. Exec.
Order No. 20–08 (Mar. 20, 2020), https://governor.kansas.gov/executive-order-no20-08/ [https://perma.cc/W98U-RFUK].
36
See Mich. Exec. Order No. 2020–17 (Mar. 20, 2020),
https://www.michigan.gov/whitmer/0,9309,7-387-90499_90705-522451--,00.html
[https://perma.cc/4JUK-FWCH]; Minn. Exec. Order No. 20–09 (Mar. 19, 2020),
https://secureservercdn.net/198.71.233.204/182.80d.myftpupload.com/wpcontent/uploads/2020/03/Emergency-Executive-Order-20-09_FINAL_As_Filed.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9M24-FGHU].
37
Tony Pugh & Lydia Wheeler, Push to Expand Doctors’ Legal Immunity for Virus
Draws Ire, BLOOMBERG LAW (June 25, 2020, 5:14 AM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/health-law-and-business/push-to-expand-doctorslegal-immunity-during-crisis-draws-ire [https://perma.cc/JEB7-2AMZ].
34
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the standard of care would encompass these mandatory changes. 38 As hospitals
restart elective surgeries, another question remains: Would they receive tort
immunity from claims from patients and workers who become infected by the virus
during visits to the hospitals? Moreover, many remedies, such as
hydroxychloroquine, have been touted by various individuals and entities but lack
proven benefits and may even harm patients. Would PREP protect the negligently
prescribed “off label” remedies and other therapies as a countermeasure under the
Act? These types of challenges are inevitable and will likely lead to litigation.
III. LIABILITY PROTECTION FOR EMPLOYERS
Legislation and directives related to the pandemic created two categories of
employers: those of essential and nonessential businesses. Essential businesses, like
grocery stores, have remained open throughout the pandemic, while nonessential
businesses are gradually re-opening throughout the country. President Trump used
his powers under the Defense Production Act to require certain businesses he deemed
essential, like meatpacking plants, to remain open. 39 Several states, like New York
and New Jersey, have addressed safe working conditions by, for example, making
mask usage mandatory for employees of essential businesses, but many states have
not. 40 As nonessential businesses have reopened, some have allowed employees to
continue working remotely as Google and Twitter have done. 41 For businesses
unable to function remotely, employers face the challenge of deciding how to keep

Id. (quoting Professor Hodge stating that “the common law ‘standard of care’
changed in March when most elective procedures and surgeries were suspended in
order to curb Covid-19 infections and preserve hospital capacity.”).
39
Exec. Order No. 13917, 85 Fed. Reg. 26,313 (Apr. 28, 2020). The Defense
Production Act provides immunity to businesses required to act; however, whether
this includes tort claims is unresolved.
40
N.J. Exec. Order No. 122 (Apr. 8, 2020),
https://nj.gov/infobank/eo/056murphy/pdf/EO-122.pdf [https://perma.cc/2K452GUN]; N.Y. Exec. Order No. 202–17 (Apr. 15, 2020),
https://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/governor.ny.gov/files/atoms/files/EO_202.17.pd
f [https://perma.cc/4UN6-GCVC]. Arizona’s governor is allowing local
governments and mayors to decide face mask requirements. See Jeremy Duda,
Ducey Won’t Mandate Masks, But Gives Eager Mayors Ability to Do So,
AZMIRROR (June 18, 2020, 9:08 AM),
https://www.azmirror.com/2020/06/17/ducey-wont-mandate-masks-but-giveseager-mayors-ability-to-do-so/.
41
Dana Brownlee, Twitter, Square Announce Work From Home Forever Option:
What Are The Risks?, FORBES (May 18, 2020, 8:08 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/danabrownlee/2020/05/18/twitter-square-announcework-from-home-forever-optionwhat-are-the-risks/#32f93b812565
[https://perma.cc/UJF8-G3LH].
38
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employees safe and healthy at work. Most states have not addressed working
conditions; OSHA has given some non-mandatory guidance. 42 Businesses look to
other businesses for guidance on how to reopen safely. 43
To support the liability shields, some commentators and politicians have predicted
that employers will face an “avalanche” of personal injury tort suits related to the
pandemic from their employees. 44 Thus far, the explosion of tort suits has not yet
materialized, and only a few personal injury lawsuits have been filed. 45 The basic
claim for these suits is that unsafe workplaces caused employees to contract Covid19.
One such lawsuit, a wrongful death claim, was filed against WalMart after an
employee died from Covid-19. 46 The suit claims that Wal-Mart ignored the
employee’s concerns about experiencing symptoms, failed to properly sanitize the
store, and failed to provide sufficient PPE for employees. 47 A similar wrongful death
lawsuit was brought against Safeway on behalf of an employee who died of Covid19. 48 The employee worked at a distribution center where fifty-one employees tested
positive for the virus. 49 Among other claims, the suit alleges that the defendants acted
negligently by failing to comply with Occupational Health and Safety Administration
(OHSA) guidelines and misleading employees by posting a sign stating that PPE was
not helpful in preventing transmission. 50 In a third suit, already dismissed, employees
in a meat processing plant alleged that their employer failed to provide adequate
protections, even when nearby plants had been forced to close after virus outbreaks. 51
In addition to wrongful death claims, several employees and their family members

See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Ryan Randazzo, With No Specific Guidance for Some Businesses,
Reopening for Customers Means Creating Their Own Rules, AZCENTRAL (June 13,
2020),
https://www.azcentral.com/search/?q=With+No+Specific+Guidance+for+Some+B
usinesses%2C+Reopening+for+Customers+Means+Creating+Their+Own+Rules%
2C+ [https://perma.cc/VVP3-Q538].
44
Jim Tankersley & Charlie Savage, Businesses Seek Sweeping Shield from
Pandemic Liability Before They Reopen, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/28/business/businesses-coronavirusliability.html [https://perma.cc/H7QU-9EZ3] (quoting Senator Mitch McConnell
warning of an “avalanche of lawsuits” if Congress doesn’t act).
45
See supra note 2.
46
Complaint at 2–3, Evans v. Walmart Inc., No. 2020-L-003938 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Apr.
6, 2020).
47
Id. at 3–4.
48
Complaint at 1, Zuniga v. Safeway Inc., No. HG20062742 (Sup. Ct. for Cal. May
13, 2020).
49
Id. at 7–8.
50
Id. at 8–10.
51
Rural Cmty Workers All. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., No. 5:20-CV-06063-DGK,
2020 WL 2145350 (W.D. Mo. May 5, 2020).
42
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have filed a public nuisance suit against McDonald’s. 52 Under this novel theory,
plaintiffs seek a court order requiring McDonald’s to take further steps to protect
their employees, such as providing adequate PPE. 53
Anticipating more lawsuits, some states have already created liability shields to
protect employers from personal injury claims. 54 For example, North Carolina gave
healthcare providers and other essential businesses liability immunity, except in
cases of “gross negligence, reckless misconduct, or intentional infliction of harm.” 55
The immunity applies to customers’ or employees’ claims of injury or death related
to Covid-19. Similarly, although the Bill’s sponsor did not know of “any Covid-19related claims in Utah,” 56 Utah’s liability immunity protects someone from suits
resulting from exposure to Covid-19 on “premises owned or operated by the person,
or during an activity managed by the person.” 57 Notably, Utah’s liability shield is not
limited to essential businesses. Although more states are considering similar
protections, 58 businesses have started to reopen even without them.
Even without special liability shields, several strong defenses are already
available to both essential and non-essential business employers that would preclude
most suits and discourage attorneys from bringing them.
A. Workers’ Compensation
State workers’ compensation schemes are considered the exclusive remedy for
workplace injuries. These administrative schemes eliminate the need for employees
to prove employer negligence, but they remove the right to bring a civil action in
court. Assuming that Covid-19 is an occupational disease or injury covered by

Complaint at 1–3, Massey v. McDonald’s Corp., No. 2020-CH-04247 (Ill. Cir.
Ct. May 19, 2020).
53
Id. at 3, 17.
54
See Ala. Proclamation—Eighth Supp. State of Emergency (May 8, 2020),
https://governor.alabama.gov/assets/2020/05/2020-05-08-8th-Supplemental-SOECOVID-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/ETT5-6N3V]; Ark. Exec. Order No 20–33 (June
15, 2020), https://governor.arkansas.gov/images/uploads/executiveOrders/EO_2033.pdf [https://perma.cc/7RTT-7JFH]; S.B. 1946, 57th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla.
2020); S.F. 1002, 65th Leg., Spec. Sess. (Wyo. 2020).
55
S.B. 704, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (N.C. 2020).
56
Taylor Stevens, Utah Governor Signs Bill Shielding Businesses, PropertyOwners from Coronavirus-Related Suits, SALT LAKE TRIB. (May 5, 2020),
https://www.sltrib.com/news/politics/2020/05/04/utah-governor-signs-bill/
[https://perma.cc/UW4T-QNXS].
57
S.B. 3007, 2020 Leg., 3d Spec. Sess. (Utah 2020).
58
E.g., Bob Christie & Jonathan J. Cooper, Arizona House Oks Coronavirus
Liability Shield for Businesses, FOX NEWS (May 22, 2020),
https://www.fox10phoenix.com/news/arizona-house-oks-coronavirus-liabilityshield-for-businesses [https://perma.cc/4L2H-25JA].
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workers’ compensation statutes, most tort claims for monetary damages by
employees will be barred by those statutes.
Although workers’ compensation schemes strongly protect employers from tort
suits, there is uncertainty surrounding whether workers’ compensation will cover
employees who contract Covid-19 on the job. While workers’ compensation can
cover “occupational diseases,” it generally does not cover “ordinary diseases of
life.” 59 In some states, workers’ compensation excludes infections if the general
public is also exposed. 60 This would likely exclude a disease as widespread as Covid19, even if certain workers, such as those in meat packing plants, are more likely to
contract it. Most people who get Covid-19 recover within a few weeks, and workers’
compensation is not usually designed to provide benefits for short-term illnesses.
Even assuming workers’ compensation extends coverage to claims for Covid-19,
employees may still struggle to bring successful claims. Generally, the schemes
require a worker to show that a disease or injury resulted from an activity within the
course or scope of employment. 61 The employee’s ability to prove that exposure
occurred in the workplace could be quite difficult since there are likely many
alternative sources of exposure. In recognition of that challenge, some states, such as
Alaska, Minnesota and Wisconsin, have enacted legislation creating a presumption
of causation that first responders contracted Covid-19 62 or respiratory diseases 63 in
the course of their employment. In California, even non-essential workers receive a
presumption. 64

59

Survey of State Workers Compensation Compensability Statutes, NAT’L COUNCIL

ON COMP. INS., INC. (May 2020), https://www.ncci.com/Articles/Pages/Insights-

Compensability-Statutory-Survey-May-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/J25T-QYZX].
60
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-601(e)(3) (1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-281
(2004); S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-11-10(B). Notably, South Carolina excludes diseases
that the general public would be “equally exposed” to, which raises questions about
employees in professions who are more likely to be exposed (such as healthcare
workers).
61
Jim Pocius, Workers Compensation and Course of Employment, INT’L RISK
MGMT INST., INC. (Feb. 2001), https://www.irmi.com/articles/expertcommentary/workers-compensation-and-course-of-employment
[https://perma.cc/GM4L-VUKF].
62
See S.B. 241, 31st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Alaska 2020), HF 4537, 91st Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Minn. 2020); WIS. STAT. § 102.03(6) (2020).
63
See D.C. CODE § 5-652 (2019); VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-402 (2020).
64
Cal. Exec. Order N-62-20 (May 6, 2020), https://www.gov.ca.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2020/05/5.6.20-EO-N-62-20-text.pdf [https://perma.cc/U2X9QUYT]. Governor Newsom’s executive order created a rebuttable presumption that
an employee who tests positive for Covid-19 within fourteen days of working at the
employee’s place of employment caught the disease in the course of employment.
This presumption is “disputable” and does not apply if the employee’s place of
employment is his own residence. Id.
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Workers’ compensation schemes do not cover all potential tort claims, and
employees may need to seek recourse in civil courts. Claims for severe emotional
distress may not be recoverable. For example, when hospitals closed to visitors,
healthcare workers became the only ones able to comfort dying patients while also
facing PPE and supply shortages. Additionally, some healthcare workers decided to
live away from their families for fear of infecting them. 65 These extraordinary
circumstances likely have taken an emotional toll, but states vary on whether psychic
trauma such as PTSD stemming from exposure to the virus would be considered an
occupational disease and thus a compensable workers’ compensation claim. In
California, for instance, diagnosed psychiatric injuries are compensable even in the
absence of a physical injury; 66 whereas, in Montana, “stress claim[s]” are not
compensable even if they accompany a physical injury. 67 If not covered, workers’
compensation would not bar the claim and the worker could pursue the claim in civil
court. Furthermore, workers’ compensation schemes typically do not cover an
employer’s intentional misconduct toward employees, so workers could bring those
claims in court. 68 Third party vendors and independent contractors such as a cleaning
crew also may not be covered by workers’ compensation schemes and thus would be
eligible to sue employers directly for unsafe conditions.
Other questions remain with regard to workers’ compensation coverage.
Understandably, very little is known about the long-term impact Covid-19 will have
on the body, but some scientists are warning that the disease may cause lasting
damage. 69 This raises important questions about the impact on workers’
compensation, especially for states creating presumptions that a worker who
contracts Covid-19 did so at work. If the employee later develops a disease linked to
surviving Covid-19, will workers’ compensation cover the claim? 70
Apart from employer defenses to workers’ compensation coverage, employers
also have strong defenses to suits brought outside that administrative scheme. The
theories of tort liability against employers will be based on a failure to take proper
precautions. Possible theories include: 1) failure to properly screen employees; 2)
failure to protect employees from other persons, both symptomatic and

Emma Grey Ellis, How Health Care Workers Avoid Brining Covid-19 Home,
WIRED (Apr. 4, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/coronavirus-covid19-health-care-workers-families/ [https://perma.cc/HYL4-YLGK] (describing how
some healthcare workers “have moved into hotel rooms or sleep in their cars”).
65

CAL. LAB. CODE § 3208.3 (Deering 2019).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-105 (2019).
68
See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1032 (2018); OR. REV. STAT. § 656.156(2)
(2018).
66
67

George Citroner, What We Know About the Long-Term Effects of COVID-19,
HEALTHLINE (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.healthline.com/health-news/what-weknow-about-the-long-term-effects-of-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/9PZ8-L5M8].
70
The same question arises with regard to coverage of long-term effects for
liability shields for businesses.
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asymptomatic; 3) failure to disclose to the workforce that an individual worker
contracted the virus; 4) failure to sufficiently clean and sanitize the workplace; 5)
failure to provide sufficient PPE; 6) failure to maintain a social distancing policy; 7)
failure to allow telecommuting, for those workplaces that can accommodate it; and
8) failure to comply with government guidelines, both state and federal. These types
of claims can be met by numerous defenses.
B. Compliance and Other Defenses
A strong defense for employers will be compliance with governmental workplace
regulations and recommendations. Several federal agencies have provided guidance
to businesses in the pandemic. OSHA has posted recommendations for Covid-19 on
its website and identified relevant pre-existing standards and regulations, including
OSHA’s PPE standards. 71 The CDC has also posted guidance on measures for
employers to take in the workplace. 72 Although the guidelines allow businesses to
show compliance, a stronger defense for businesses would come from following
regulations, statutes, or standards. 73 But so far, these regulations or statutes have not
been forthcoming. 74
Other strong defenses to these claims include assumption of risk, comparative
fault, and co-worker negligence. For example, businesses could argue under a
comparative fault scheme damages should be reduced because of negligent behavior
by the injured actor. In other words, it may argue that employees enhanced the risks
of contracting the disease due to their own carelessness and failure to take personal
responsibility for exposure. This duty of self-care arguably increases if an employee
is in a high-risk category.
Calling the employee’s behavior into question raises a host of other issues—in
particular the knowing and voluntary assumption of the risk of exposure. This
defense could be either for implied or express assumption of risk in the form of a
liability waiver. As discussed in Part IV below, some employers and businesses are
requiring their employees and patrons to sign these waivers, although the validity of
the waiver will depend on several factors. 75 Implied assumption of risk poses another

Guidance on Preparing Workplaces for COVID-19, OSHA,
https://www.osha.gov/Publications/OSHA3990.pdf [https://perma.cc/GJ5D-45KZ].
72
Interim Guidance for Businesses and Employers Responding to Coronavirus
Disease 2019 (COVID-19), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (May
2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/guidance-businessresponse.html [https://perma.cc/YJ2J-WFEY].
73
If a defendant complied with a federal regulation, statute, or standard, the
defendant could raise a preemption defense that could preclude a tort claim. See
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
74
See Examining Liability During the COVID-19 Pandemic, S. Judiciary Comm.,
116th Cong. 7–8 (2020) (statement of David C. Vladeck, Professor, Georgetown
University Law Center) (urging the federal government and agencies to provide
guidance to businesses).
75
See infra notes 96–100 and accompanying text.
71
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set of problems. On the one hand, employees could be charged with knowingly and
voluntarily exposing themselves to other sources of the virus. On the other hand, it
is arguable that employees do not voluntarily assume the risk in returning to a
workplace that they consider unsafe with the threat of losing unemployment benefits
if they fail to return to work.
C. Open Questions
Demonstrating that an employee contracted Covid-19 at work may not fully
resolve who is liable. If the employer is a building tenant, the employee may be able
to seek compensation from the building owner by filing a premises liability claim.
For example, the building owner would likely be responsible for the elevator and
common areas, whereas the business tenant would be responsible for operations
within the business. This may raise very specific questions of causation regarding
where the employee contracted the virus.
Individual industries, such as the previously mentioned nursing home industry,
have been lobbying for immunity protections. Another group pushing for immunity
is universities. Universities present a unique set of circumstances. On the one hand,
they are critical to educating healthcare and other workers and funding researchers.
They offer an important, some would say critical, public good. 76 On the other hand,
they do not provide life-saving services like health care providers or everyday
necessities like grocery stores. They have alternative methods to deliver some of their
services; they can offer the option of classes online so that students do not need to
risk exposure. Universities have responded to the pandemic in different ways. Some
have decided to use remote learning for all classes, 77 while others plan to reopen in
the fall. 78 Still others are taking a hybrid approach.
Although not a traditional business, universities face the same potential lawsuits
as other employers, as well as suits from their “patrons,” the students. Many
universities are already facing lawsuits from students for tuition and fee
reimbursements stemming from the move to remote learning in March; 79 however,

Some states have deemed universities an essential business for Covid-19
purposes. E.g., Ariz. Exec. Order No. 2020-12 (Mar. 23, 2020),
https://azgovernor.gov/executive-orders.
77
E.g., Daniel Uria, Cal State Schools to Keep Campuses Closed for Fall Semester,
UPI (May 12, 2020), https://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2020/05/12/Cal-Stateschools-to-keep-campuses-closed-for-fall-semester/7361589325441/
[https://perma.cc/3YPE-JNEL].
78
E.g., Anemona Hartocollis & Dan Levin, Notre Dame Plans to Reopen Its
Campus in the Fall, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/18/us/notre-dame-reopening-coronavirus.html
[https://perma.cc/E5S8-8HCE].
79
E.g., Andrew Keshner, At Least 100 Lawsuits Have Been Filed by Students
Seeking College Refunds — And They Open Some Thorny Questions,
MARKETWATCH (May 22, 2020, 8:23 AM),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/unprecedented-lawsuits-from-students-suing76
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like other businesses, there does not appear to be an explosion of personal injury suits
against universities. Lobbying groups for higher education have begun pushing
Congress to grant liability immunity if campuses are open in the fall. 80 Some states,
like North Carolina, have already granted immunity to certain businesses and
educational facilities. 81
Because of the highly infectious nature of Covid-19, consideration of the
environment within university buildings may become crucial. As a hybrid between
administering both open public and contained spaces, university buildings present
significant redesign challenges to both classroom settings and student housing.
Measures to promote social distancing, such as reducing class sizes and dormitory
occupancy, as well as Plexiglas barriers and HVAC conditions may be important
tools to combat the spread. The extent to which universities and other businesses that
invite the public need to re-design buildings in order to meet the standard of care is
an open question. 82 Nonetheless, universities recognize that they can only mitigate
risks and that they may become a virus hotspot, given the 24/7 nature of their
environment. As a contained environment, it may be inevitable that some students
will contract the virus. 83
The CDC has not set specific standards for reopening universities, although it has
offered some guidelines on such areas as residence halls, class size, and testing
availability. Tort law traditionally fills in the gap left by the lack of standards in an

colleges-amid-the-coronavirus-outbreak-raise-3-thorny-questions-for-highereducation-2020-05-21 [https://perma.cc/B52C-C4ZG].
80
Danielle McLean, Higher-Ed Lobbying Group, Eyeing an In-Person Fall, Asks
Congress for Liability Shields, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (May 28, 2020),
https://www.chronicle.com/article/Higher-Ed-Lobbying-Group/248878
[https://perma.cc/UM3M-AS89].
81
S.B. 704, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (N.C. 2020).
82
Eric K. Clemons, COVID-19 on Campus: How Should Schools Be Redesigned?,
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (June 22, 2020),
https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/how-should-universities-beredesigned-in-the-wake-of-covid19/?utm_source=The+Abstract&utm_campaign=d0ac61bc42EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_LR_Abstract_June20&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_
9e1c242ede-d0ac61bc42-338850365 [https://perma.cc/799D-BDEC]
(“Redesigning elite academic institutions provides a concrete example of the most
difficult design problem.”).
83
One school, Middlebury College, has taken robust steps to minimize the spread
among students. See Laurie L. Patton, Initial Decisions about the Fall Semester,
MIDDLEBURY (June 22, 2020),
https://www.middlebury.edu/office/announcements/previousannouncements/initial-decisions-about-fall-semester [https://perma.cc/8ZY7UMEY] (requiring fourteen-day quarantine at home before returning to school;
seven day on-campus quarantine; and after a negative Covid-19 test, remaining on
the closed campus for the semester).
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industry. Without tort law protections, irresponsible or hard-pressed colleges could
ignore the broad guidelines and create a race to the bottom, given the financial
pressures they face right now. And while the pandemic may have exposed higher
education to a financial crisis, that problem will not be solved with tort immunity.
D. Other Compensation Options
Governments can protect employers from civil lawsuits in other ways, without
enacting shield immunities. One way is to create a victim’s compensation fund for
essential workers. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Congress created the September
11th Victim Compensation Fund for individuals who developed an illness, were
injured, or were killed as a result of the attacks or cleanup efforts. 84 Congress also
created a compensation fund for individuals who suffer injury from childhood
vaccinations. 85 Congress could create a similar Covid-19 claims fund, either
federally funded or funded through a tax scheme. Currently, the proposed Pandemic
Heroes Compensation Act would create a compensation fund for essential workers
who fall sick or die from Covid-19. 86
Another approach is to create a reinsurance pool, which has been used to protect
certain high-risk industries. When nuclear power was developed, insurers were faced
with potentially having to insure a disastrous accident leading to widespread
contamination. In order to encourage development of the industry, market-wide
insurance pools were created. 87 Like nuclear power, Covid-19 has the potential to
create such substantial liability and cause insurance companies to exclude coverage
for Covid-19 related claims. A reinsurance pool could help ensure that insurance
would be extended to those claims. 88
IV. LAWSUITS BY BUSINESS PATRONS
Businesses owe a duty to take reasonable measures to provide a safe environment
for customers. This would generally require a business owner to evaluate whether a
dangerous condition exists, take steps to reduce the danger, and warn of the danger.

Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Publ. L. No. 107-42, §
403, 115 Stat. 230, 237 (2001).
85
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-1 to -34 (2006).
86
Press Release, Reps. Maloney, Nadler, King and Sen. Duckworth Unveil
Legislation to Create Compensation Fund for Essential Workers (May 14, 2020),
https://maloney.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/reps-maloney-nadler-kingand-sen-duckworth-unveil-legislation-to-create [https://perma.cc/MN2G-6QVU].
87
The Insurance of Nuclear Pools and Associate Risks, NUCLEAR RISK INSURERS
LTD., https://www.nuclearpools.com/about-us [https://perma.cc/63PH-686G].
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See Timothy D. Lytton, Opinion, Businesses That Reopen Unsafely Should be
Subject to Liability, REG. REV. (May 4, 2020),
https://www.theregreview.org/2020/05/04/lytton-businesses-reopening-tortliability/ [https://perma.cc/S29Q-DU6S] (explaining that liability insurers are able
to leverage their power to encourage businesses to meet certain standards).
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This may include requiring face coverings, conducting temperature checks, and
providing sufficient ventilation. It may also include redesigning spaces open to the
public, as mentioned above. 89
Grocery stores and other essential businesses have already implemented many
precautions to maintain reasonably safe premises for their patrons. Many require
social distancing and post signs requiring customers to wear a mask. Some
businesses clean shopping carts and have installed Plexiglas at checkout counters.
Others have converted to curbside pick-up only. As non-essential businesses have
reopened, they have implemented similar precautions.
Personal injury lawsuits by patrons have not yet materialized. 90 Because of the
strong defenses available to business owners facing liability lawsuits, plaintiff
lawyers do not have strong incentives to bring these cases. Business owners acting
with reasonable care should not need the shields. Aside from being unnecessary,
liability shields may have unintended consequences. They can protect the businesses
that practice lower safety standards and give them a competitive edge over businesses
that maintain a higher standard. In his testimony before Congress, Professor David
C. Vladeck argued that immunity to help states re-open would be
“counterproductive.” 91 Vladeck emphasized that liability protections only protect the
“non-compliant” and warned that removing liability would leave consumers and
employees feeling unsafe. 92
Perhaps the strongest defense available to business owners from suits by patrons
may be assumption of risk, either express or implied. This may bar, or at least reduce,
recovery for business patrons who understand the dangers of contracting the virus
and yet voluntarily accept them when they frequent the business. 93 Many businesses,
such as gyms, require their patrons to sign an express waiver form acknowledging
the risks and willingly undertaking them. 94 Even law students may be asked to waive

These changes can also be driven by the liability insurance industry because
insurers can “sell[] insurance only to those businesses that implement appropriate
risk-reduction measures, provid[e] premium discounts to businesses that take extra
precautions, or exclude[e] coverage for high-risk activities such as crowded
gatherings.” Id. The insurance market can help minimize the financial risks to
businesses by incentivizing these kinds of changes. Id.
90
See supra note 2.
91
Examining Liability During the COVID-19 Pandemic, S. Judiciary Comm., 116th
Cong. 1–3 (2020) (statement of David C. Vladeck, Professor, Georgetown
University Law Center). Professor Vladeck also questions the constitutionality of
Congress creating such widespread immunity. Id. at 14–20.
92
Id. at 1, 5–6.
93
S.B. 359, 2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2020) (to be codified as O.C.G.A. § 51-163) (creating an assumption of risk presumption if a business places a written
warning on a receipt or proof of purchase for entry or on a sign at a point of entry).
94
See, e.g., Kate Gibson, COVID-19 Liability Waivers Now Part of Going to Hair
Salons, Gyms, Theme Parks and More, CBS NEWS (June 12, 2020, 9:10 AM),
89
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their rights before taking the bar exam. 95 Whether these agreements are enforceable
is uncertain and state-driven.
Waivers, which lie at the intersection of tort and contract law, ask the signee to
assume the risk of engaging in the relevant activity. Courts generally uphold them
for waiving negligence but not for claims of gross negligence, recklessness, or
intentional torts. 96 Some states will not enforce waivers in the case of personal injury
claims, 97 while others may emphasize freedom of contract principles and be more
likely to enforce waivers. 98
Even in states allowing personal injury waivers, several restrictions exist. The
waiver usually must be clear and unambiguous, 99 and the signee needs to be able to
understand what was agreed to. Significantly, courts do not enforce waivers if doing
so would go against public policy. 100 This public policy exception will be important

https://www.cbsnews.com/news/covid-19-liability-waivers-now-part-of-going-tohair-salons-gyms/ [https://perma.cc/Q4VE-2K3B].
95
See Stephanie Francis Ward, Two States Introduce COVID-19 Waivers for July
Bar Exams, ABA J. (June 2, 2020, 3:42 PM),
https://www.abajournal.com/web/article/liability-waivers-may-not-mean-muchbut-two-states-include-them-for-july-in-person-bar-exam [https://perma.cc/55HQBBJ3].
96
See, e.g., 15 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §85.18 (2019) (“The general rule of
exculpatory agreements is that a party may agree to exempt another party from tort
liability if that tort liability results from ordinary negligence. Courts do not enforce
[exculpatory] agreements . . . if the liability results from that party’s own gross
negligence, recklessness, or intentional conduct.”).
97
See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2004 (2018); Hiett v. Lake Barcroft Cmty Ass’n,
418 S.E.2d. 894, 896 (Va. 1992) (“[P]rovisions for release from liability for
personal injury which may be caused by future acts of negligence are prohibited
‘universally.’”).
98
See, e.g., Neighborhood Assistance Corp. of Am. v. Dixon, 593 S.E.2d 717, 718
(Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (“It is the paramount public policy of this state that courts will
not lightly interfere with the freedom of parties to contract. . . . Exculpatory clauses
in Georgia are valid and binding. . . .”) (quoting My Fair Lady v. Harris, 364
S.E.2d 580, 581 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987)); Sharon v. Newton, 769 N.E.2d 738, 744
(Mass. 2002) (“Massachusetts law favors the enforcement of releases.”) (citing Lee
v. Allied Sports Assocs., Inc. 208 N.E.2d 329, 332 (Mass. 1965)).
99
See, e.g., Potter v. National Handicapped Sports, 849 F. Supp. 1407, 1409 (D.
Colo. 1994) (examining “whether the intention of the parties is expressed in clear
and unambiguous language” to determine the validity of an exculpatory contract)
(citing Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 376 (Colo. 1981)).
100
See, e.g., Topp Copy Prods. v. Singletary, 626 A.2d 98, 99 (Pa. 1993) (“[T]he
[exculpatory] clause must not contravene public policy.”). Six factors are often
considered when determining whether the public interest was adversely affected by
a waiver: 1) the involved business is “generally thought suitable for public
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in the context of Covid-19 waivers. It may argue in favor of distinguishing between
waivers for essential and non-essential services. Thus, waivers for using grocery
stores may be unenforceable while waivers for using gyms may be upheld. Even if
the original waiver were upheld, if the signee infects a spouse or other third party,
the waiver would not likely be enforceable against the non-signer. In that case, the
third party would still be able to sue the negligent business.
Waivers in the employment context raise other validity questions. It may go
against public policy for employers to ask employees to sign waivers if they feel they
may lose their jobs if they refuse. At least two universities have asked student athletes
(a quasi-employment context) to sign waivers in order to participate in workouts. 101
Although those schools indicated that failure to sign would not affect scholarships,
other schools may not make that explicit. That may render the waiver unenforceable
on public policy grounds.
Many of the arguments against granting liability immunity also apply to enforcing
liability waivers. Proponents of waivers may point to freedom of contract (and a
bargained for reduction in price for services or goods) and argue that waivers allow
businesses to reopen without the threat of litigation looming over them. However,
liability waivers may create disincentives to maintain a non-negligent standard of
care. If waivers shield businesses from liability, businesses may decide to cut corners
and risk the safety of consumers and employees. Furthermore, if businesses are
meeting the standard of care, they will not be found to be negligent and should not
need protection from waivers in the first place.
To combat these unintended consequences from public and private shields, one
option would be to strengthen one of the most important defenses available to
business, the compliance defense. States could make the defense absolute. This

regulation,” 2) the party is “engaged in performing a service of great importance to
the public” or of practical necessity for some 3) the “party holds himself out as
willing to perform this service for any member of the public who seeks it,” 4) the
“party invoking exculpation possesses a decisive advantage of bargaining strength
against any member of the public who seeks his services,” 5) the party “makes no
provision whereby a purchaser may pay additional reasonable fees and obtain
protection against negligence,” and 6) the “person or property of the purchaser is
placed under the control of the seller, subject to the risk of carelessness by the seller
or his agents.” Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 445–46 (Cal.
1963).
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assumes, however, that the standards—by OSHA and the CDC—are comprehensive
and up-to-date. As Professor Vladeck argued, until consumers and employees feel
protected, the economy will falter. 102 Instead, he argued that regulatory compliance
would help businesses defend against tort suits without allowing bad actors to avoid
liability. 103 Professor Vladeck encouraged federal agencies who “have left the
playing field” to provide detailed guidance. 104 In order for businesses to rely on a
strong compliance defense, the government must provide clear guidelines so that
businesses wishing to take advantage of the defense are able to.
CONCLUSION
Tort liability is an important instrument to regulating health and safety.
Accordingly, we need to examine closely the motivation to eliminate that benefit
during the pandemic by offering businesses immunity from personal injury lawsuits.
Tort liability poses little threat to businesses that act reasonably. Although they
would surely prefer to be rid of lawsuits at the pleading stage, they have an excellent
chance of successfully defeating personal injury claims in the Covid-19 context and
so are not easy prey for plaintiff lawyers. To be found negligent, the business would
have to be operating without such precautions as social distancing, gloves, masks
and disinfecting measures, which is unlikely. Even if this were the case, causation
would be very challenging for the plaintiff to prove. Employers have the added
protection of workers’ compensation and strong defenses like regulatory compliance.
Balanced against all of those existing liability protections in the law, immunity
shields may not only be unnecessary, but they may be counterproductive. They signal
to workers and patrons that they return to work or patronize the business at their own
peril. Creating this anxiety is the opposite of the trust we want to instill to encourage
the restart of our economy. We certainly do not want to encourage businesses to cut
corners with impunity during the pandemic.
Shield proponents caution that, as businesses reopen—which is a social good—it
is inevitable that they will see higher rates of infection among employees and patrons
regardless of the precautions they take. But eliminating the risk of tort liability may
make those health risks even greater by reducing incentives to meet safety standards
and lowering accountability. Tort law offers a more nuanced approach by
encouraging employers to act safely while minimizing their liability exposure if they
do. 105
Alternative measures should be considered as well. Strengthening the compliance
defense through comprehensive regulation would add more certainty to businesses,
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employees, and the public. Legislative solutions along the lines of the 9/11 Victim’s
Compensation Fund are another approach. Creating a government fund for essential
workers harmed by the virus may be more efficient and ultimately more equitable,
given the likelihood that inconsistent verdicts will occur across the various state
jurisdictions. To avoid inconsistencies, we could consolidate all the Covid-19
personal injury litigation in one designated court, at least on the federal level. Finally,
Congress could create a federally backed secondary insurance fund, such as created
to protect the nuclear energy industry, to encourage primary insurance to cover
Covid-19 personal injury claims.
The balance between economic and health concerns is critical in this context. Tort
law can help optimize the right amount of safety to address both concerns.

